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R ELIGIOUS D ISCOURSE IN THE P UBLIC S QUARE
David Blaikie and Diana Ginn

INTRODUCTION
Full, open, and civilized discourse among
citizens is fundamental to the life of a liberal
democracy. It seems trite to assert that no
discourse should be prohibited or excluded simply
because it is grounded in religious faith or
employs religious beliefs to justify a particular
position.1 Yet there are those who contend that it

1

W e realize that w e cannot do full justice in an article of this
length to the issues that w e raise here. W e see this article as
allow ing us to provide an introduction to and overview of the
topic and to organize our thoughts around some of the key
points. W e w ill then explore these issues in greater depth, as is
w arranted by their complexity, in our future w ork. The focus of
our article is not sim ply “the bases on w hich citizens rely in
making political choices but also the bases on w hich citizens
may and should rely in justifying political choices.” M ichael J.
Perry, Love and P ow er: The Role of Religion and M orality in
Am erican Politics (N ew Y ork: O xford U niversity Press, 1991)
at 17 [Perry, Love and Pow er]. O ur references in this article are
primarily to Christianity or, some-times, the combined JudeoC hristian tradition. There are tw o reasons for this focus. First,
w here we refer to religious influences on the development of
the W estern legal tradition, it is accurate to focus on the JudeoC hristian tradition as the religious tradition that has most
heavily influenced that development. W e w ould suggest that
much the same relationship exists betw een the Judeo-C hristian
tradition and the W estern legal system as Northrup Frye
suggested exists betw een the B ible and W estern literature. In
W ords W ith Pow er (M arkham: Penguin Books C anada Ltd.,
1990) [Frye, W ords]. Frye builds on ideas initially developed in
The G reat Code: The Bible and Literature (Toronto: A cademic
Press, 1982), arguing (W ords, ibid. at xi) that “the structure of
the B ible, as revealed by its narrative and imagery" has shaped
the "conventions and genres of W estern literature.” Of course,
it is quite possible that future legal developments w ill reflect the
grow ing religious pluralism of Canada. Second, w here we give
examples to elaborate on a particular point, these relate
primarily (although not exclusively) to C hristianity because w e
are w riting out of our ow n experiences and backgrounds. This
is the only religious tradition in w hich we have worshipped and
about w hich we feel knowledgeable enough to comment in any
depth. H ow ever, w e do not w ant to be misunderstood as
making arguments only about religious discourse based on
C hristian beliefs. It is our position that spirituality continues to
be of importance for many individuals today; that for many
such individuals, their religious beliefs undergird their political
view s; and that explicit references to those beliefs is an
appropriate part of public discourse. This position applies to all
religions, not just C hristianity. A s the homogeneity of Canada's
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is improper for citizens to use religious arguments
when debating or deciding issues in the public
square, 2 that metaphorical arena where issues of
public policy are discussed and contested. In this
article we challenge this position, examining the
various arguments that are put forward for keeping
public discourse secular, arguments that when
citizens explicitly ground their social and political
views in their religious beliefs, this is divisive,
exclusionary, and ultimately antithetical to the
liberal democratic state. We maintain that none of
these arguments are persuasive.3

2

3

religious landscape is leavened by immigrants bringing deep
religious roots in a variety of different faith traditions, it seems
likely that the religious reasons relied on in public debates w ill
more and more reflect this diversity.
O ur discussion draw s primarily on A merican w ritings on this
topic, and in particular Robert A udi & N icholas W olterstorff,
Religion in the Public Square (N ew Y ork: Row man &
Littlefield, 1997) [A udi & W olterstorff].
There w as a time in W estern society w hen religion played a far
m ore overt role in shaping public policy and law than is the
case today. Duncan Forrester suggests that “in the past a
theological approach, or at least an explicitly theological
dimension to the discussion, w as almost universal in w estern
political thought . . . . The political significance of theology w as
almost universally assum ed.” C hristian Justice and Public
Policy (C ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 10.
In the world of medieval Europe, for instance, it w as thought
natural and inevitable that Christian theology would m ould
secular as well as ecclesiastic law , both in terms of how law
itself w as conceptualized and in the specific content of the law .
W hile the political significance of theology is no longer
universally assumed, the law in Canada today still bears the
imprint of that earlier time. In Law and R evolution: The
Formation of the W estern Legal Tradition, H arold J. Berman
makes a convincing argument that the “basic institutions,
concepts, and values of W estern legal systems have their
sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the
eleventh and twelfth centuries” (C am bridge: H arvard
U niversity Press, 1983) at 165 [B erm an, Law and Revolution].
A ccording to Berman, reforms initiated by the Roman Catholic
C hurch in medieval Europe that are still foundational to our
legal system include: the introduction of rational trial
procedures to replace magical mechanical modes of proof by
ordeals of fire and w ater, by battles of champions, and by ritual
oaths; the insistence upon consent as the foundation of marriage
and upon wrongful intent as the basis of crime and the
development of equity to protect the poor and the helpless
against the rich and the powerful and to enforce relations of
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Religion continues to be important to a
significant number of Canadians. In the 2001
census, 16 percent of the population declared
themselves as having no religion.4 This means that
over 80 percent of Canadians consider themselves
to have some religious beliefs, whether this means
an affiliation to an established faith tradition or
simply a sense of the spirituality inherent in life.
Various observers of today’s culture argue that
many Canadians are in fact deeply interested in
spiritual matters.5
W e would argue that, for many religious
believers, their faith (whatever that faith may be)
is the lens through which they view any issue of
significance, including legal issues, and that there
are no convincing reasons to characterize
religious-based arguments as an illegitimate form
of public discourse. It may be that explicit
identification of one’s religious views as the
source for one’s social values is less frequent
today in the Western world (at least in part,

4

5
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trust and confidence. See H arold J. B erm an, Faith and O rder:
The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (A tlanta: Scholars
Press, 1993) at 4. O ther, less progressive examples can also be
found. For instance, in the past, the restricted legal status of
w omen within marriage and the exclusion of w omen from
public life were no doubt influenced in part by the dominant
C hristian theology of the day. W e w ould note tangentially here
that a knowledge of (even if not necessarily a belief in) the
basic tenets of Judaism and C hristianity will provide insight
into the historical development of C anada's law s. Presumably
a know ledge of other religions would contribute to an
understanding of other legal traditions. Thus, it seems likely
that studying the basic tenets of H induism might w ell be
relevant to understanding how law developed in India;
understanding C onfucianism might w ell illuminate one's
understanding of law in China, at least until the time of the
C hinese R evolution.
Statistics C anada, ?Population by Religion, by Provinces and
Territories,” 2001 C ensus, online: <http://w w w .statcan.ca/
english/Pgdb/demo30a.htm>. There w ere significant regional
variations, from a m ere 2.5 percent of N ew foundlanders
reporting themselves as being of no religion to 35 percent and
37 percent in B ritish Colum bia and Y ukon, respectively.
In his m ost recent book, Restless G ods: The Renaissance of
Religion in C anada (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 2002),
sociologist R eginald B ibby states, “It's time w e said it: w hen it
came to predicting the future of religion generally and
C hristianity specifically, K arl M arx, Em ile Durkheim, and
Sigmund Freud were wrong. Societies and individuals have not
ceased to have a need for religion.” Q uoted in Jim C oggins,
“N o L on ger Interested? ” online: E ncou nter
<http://w w w .encountergod.com/20/interested.html>. In 1999,
G eorge Gallup stated: “There is a searching for spirituality and
a hunger for G od such as w e have not seen in 65 years of
scientific polling.” Q uoted in D r. Ian Ritchie, “Spirituality on
the M arch,” online: <http://w w w 3.sym patico.ca/ian.ritchie/
Secularization.htm>.

perhaps, because such discourse has been
delegitimized by some modern theorists). It
nevertheless seems logical and in fact inevitable
that, as long as religious beliefs persist, 6 some
individuals will want to make religious-based
arguments on matters of law and public policy.
This should not be surprising, given the nature
of religion and of law. Both involve a belief that
there are right ways and wrong ways of living in
community with others. Both involve some vision
of what a “just society” or the “Kingdom of God”
should look like – even if there is intense
disagreement within a society or within a religion
as to the content of this vision. Therefore, for
many people of faith, discerning the religious
dimension in questions of law and public policy is
a vital part of determining their response to those
questions. In fact, for anyone who sincerely
believes that religious faith involves a journey
toward understanding and acting upon God’s will,
how could the insights gained throughout that
journey not affect one’s views on many issues of
legal and constitutional significance? And why, if
engaged in public deliberation on or justification
of those views, would one not articulate those
insights? 7 As Richard Moon notes:

6

K aren A rmstrong suggests:
[H ]uman beings are spiritual animals. Indeed, there
is a case for arguing that H om o sapiens is also
H om o religiosus. M en and w omen started to
w orship gods as soon as they became recognisably
human; they created religions at the same time as
they created w orks of art. This w as not sim ply
because they w anted to propitiate pow erful forces
but these early faiths expressed the wonder and
mystery that seems alw ays to have been an essential
component of the human experience of this
beautiful yet terrifying w orld. Like art, religion has
been an attempt to find meaning and value in life,
despite the suffering that flesh is heir to. Like any
other human activity, religion can be abused but it
seems to have been something that w e have alw ays
done. It w as not tacked on to a primordially secular
nature by m anipulative kings and priests but w as
natural to humanity.

7

A H istory of G od (London: H einemann, 1993) at 3.
Issues that religious believers might see as particularly affected
by their faith include: same-sex marriage (e.g., H alpern v.
C anada (Attorney G eneral) (2003), 225 D .L.R. (4 th ) 529 (O nt.
C A ), online: C anLII <http://canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2003/
2003onca10102.html>); assisted suicide (e.g., Rodriguez v.
British C olum bia (Attorney G eneral), [1993] 3 S.C .R . 519,
on line: C anL II <h ttp://w w w .canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1993/
1993scc101.html>); abortion (e.g., R. v. M orgentaler, [1988] 1
S.C .R . 30, online: C anLII <http://w w w .canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/
1988/1988scc2.html>); new genetic technologies (e.g., Harvard
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While we may seek to minimize direct
religious conflict and confrontation in
public life, we must also recognize that
religious commitment has implications for
how adherents should live their lives in
the larger community and for the kind of
society they should work to create.8
Yet, the legitimacy of religious-based
discourse in the public square is far from
universally accepted by academic writers, and so
we move to the main focus of this article:
responding to arguments that would exclude such
discourse from public policy discussion and
decision-making. Before we do so, however, we
pause to point out that we are not arguing that
religious-based discourse will always move us in

8

C ollege v. Canada (C om m issioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C .R .
45, 2002 SC C 76, online: CanLII <http://w w w .canlii.org/
c a/c as/sc c/2 0 0 2 /2 0 0 2 sc c7 6.h tm l> ); th e pro h ib itio n o n
discrimination in hum an rights or constitutional law , as well as
legal exceptions to that prohibition; the extent to w hich our
system of taxation should redistribute resources; w hether the
criminal law should be aimed at retribution or rehabilitation;
and how the secular law should apply to the ordering of
relationships w ithin a religious community or betw een that
community and others in society. This last issue encom passes
a w ide variety of questions. For instance, do human rights law ,
labour law, and administrative law apply to the hiring, terms of
employment, or dismissal of clergy? See, e.g.,, M cCaw v.
U nited Church of Canada (1991), 4 O .R . 3d 481 (C A ). Can a
religious school impose religious-based requirements on
students or teachers? See, e.g., Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1
S.C .R . 493, online: C anLII <http://w w w .canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/
1998/1998scc30.html>; and Trinity W estern U niversity v.
British C olum bia C ollege of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C .R . 772,
2001 SC C 31, online: CanLII <http://canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2001/
2001scc31.html> [Trinity W estern]. C an a school, w hether
public or w ith religious affiliations, refuse, on religious
grounds, to use certain texts as teaching m aterials or to have
those texts in the school library? See, e.g., C ham berlain v.
Surrey School D istrict N o. 36, [2002] 4 S.C .R . 710, 2002 SC C
86, online: C anLII <http://w w w .org/ca/cas/scc/2002/2002
scc86.html> [C ham berlain]. W hat happens w hen child w elfare
law conflicts w ith a religious community’s views on raising
children? Can parents refuse life-saving medical treatment for
their child if the treatment is prohibited by their religious
beliefs? See, e.g., R.B. v. C .A.S. of M etropolitan Toronto,
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, online: CanLII <http://ww w .canlii.
org/ca/cas/scc/1995/1995scc7. html>. H ow does the law
respond if, on separation or divorce, parents are in disagreement
as to the religious education of their children? See, generally,
on these issues, M .H . O gilvie, Religious Institutions and the
Law in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irw in Law, 2003). On any one
of these issues, and myriad others, it w ould be difficult for
people of faith to arrive at a conclusion w ithout reference to
their religious beliefs.
R ichard M oon, “Liberty, N eutrality and Inclusion: Religious
Freedom U nder the C anadian Charter of R ights and Freedoms”
41 B randeis Law Journal 563 at 573 [M oon].
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the direction of justice and compassion.9 Nor
would we think it persuasive for those who would
exclude religious-based arguments from public
discussion to seek to justify their position by
maintaining that the influence of religion on
society has been or will be consistently negative .

T HE L EGITIMACY OF R ELIGIOUS
D ISCOURSE IN THE P UBLIC S QUARE
We suggested above that as long as religious
beliefs persist, some individuals will want to make
religious-based arguments on matters of law and
public policy. This being the case, are there valid
reasons for keeping such discourse out of the
public square? As we examine the various
arguments that have been put forth for keeping
public policy discussion secular,10 it is our view

9

10

Thus, we w ould not join with Paul Horw itz, “The Sources and
Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal D emocracy: Section
2(a) and B eyond” (1996) 54 U niversity of Toronto Faculty Law
R eview 1 [H orw itz], arguing that “religion is an intrinsic good”
(at 55) or that “as an intuitive proposition it [the idea that
religion is intrinsically good] is both clear and compelling.
Even those w ho lack religious faith can understand the ineffable
and invaluable quality of religious commitment” (at 56). W e do
not take this position for at least tw o reasons. First, H orw itz's
assumption that this proposition is compelling seems doubtful;
it is unlikely that those who have consciously discarded the
religious beliefs in w hich they w ere raised (and not replaced
these with another set of religious beliefs) w ould find
arguments about the intrinsic good of religion to be compelling.
Second, Horw itz's assumption seems insufficiently nuanced to
deal with the variations among and complexities of the beliefs
(and ensuing behaviours) that could be labeled “religious.”
W hile w e respond in this paper to argum ents advanced by
secular thinkers as to why religion should be kept private and
w hy the public square should be kept secular, it is only fair to
note that some religious believers w ould also argue that religion
and politics do not mix; that spirituality means keeping one’s
eye firmly on the life to com e or on one’s inner consciousness,
rather than on the realities of everyday life. The fact that some
believers may wish to limit their engagement w ith or withdraw
from public life does not, how ever, end the discussion, since
this is far from a universal characteristic of those with religious
beliefs. There w ill alw ays be those w hose faith calls them into
action in this w orld. The prophetic role of faith has strong roots
in the Jewish and C hristian traditions. It embodies an
understanding of the “K ingdom of G od” as something to be
w orked for here on earth, rather than simply anticipated either
after death or at the end of the world. C learly too, a quest for
social justice has strong roots in Islam. It seem s likely that
other faith communities also encompass a sense of the
transformative role of religion in civil society. Perry suggests
that: “Partly in consequence of mutually transformative
ecumenical encounter and dialogue with one or more of the
semitic religions, Indic spiritualities–in particular, H induism
and Buddhism –are retrieving from their margins their prophetic
resources.” Perry, Love and Pow er, supra note 1 at 81
[footnotes omitted].
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that, these arguments, whether taken separately or
in combination with each other, are simply not
convincing.11
Arguments for keeping religious discussion
separate from public policy discussions are
founded on beliefs about the nature of a secular
state or, more specifically, the nature of liberal
democracy.12 Wolterstorff describes the liberal
position: “[C]itizens (and officials) are not to base
their decisions and/or debates concerning political
issues on their religious convictions.” 13 Of course,

11

12

13
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Those in favour of constraints on religious discourse in the
public square include: Robert A udi, Religious Com m itm ent and
Secular Reason (New Y ork: C ambridge U niversity Press,
2000); R obert A udi, “The Place of Religious A rgument in a
Free and D em ocratic Society” (1993) 30 San D iego Law
R eview 677; K ent G reenaw alt, Religious Convictions and
Political C hoice (N ew Y ork: O xford U niversity Press, 1988)
[G reenaw alt, Religious C onvictions]; K ent G reenaw alt,
“G rounds for Political Judgm ent: The Status of Personal
Experience and the A utonomy and Generality of Principles of
R estraint” (1993) 30 San D iego Law Review 647 [G reenaw alt,
“G rounds for Political Judgment”]; W illiam P. M arshall, “The
O ther Side of R eligion” (1993) 44 H astings Law Journal 843;
Suzanna Sherry, “The Sleep of R eason” (1996) 84 G eorgetow n
Law Journal 453; and John R aw ls, Political Liberalism (N ew
Y ork: C olumbia U niversity Press, 1993) [R aw ls]. Those
arguing against limits include: Larry Alexander, “Liberalism,
R eligion and the U nity of Epistemology” (1993) 30 San D iego
Law R eview 763 [Alexander]; Jonathan Chaplin, “Beyond
Liberal Restraint: D efending R eligiously-B ased A rguments in
Law and Public Policy” (2000) 33 U niversity of B ritish
C olumbia Law R eview 617 [Chaplin]; Frederick M . G edicks,
“Public Life and H ostility to R eligion” (1992) 78 V irginia Law
R eview 671; Frederick M . G edicks, “The Religious, the
Secular, and the A ntithetical” (1991) 20 Capital U niversity Law
R eview 113 [G edicks]; D avid H ollenbach, “Contexts of the
Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture” (1993) 30
San Diego Law Review 877; M ichael W . M cConnell, “Five
R easons to Reject the Claim That Religious A rguments Should
B e Excluded from D emocratic D eliberation” (1999) U tah Law
R eview 639; Perry, Love and Pow er, supra note 1; M ichael J.
Perry, “R eligious M orality and Political Choice: Further
Thoughts – and Second Thoughts – O n Love and Pow er”
(1993) 30 San Diego Law R eview 703; Steven Shiffrin,
“Propter H onoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy” (1999)
74 N otre D am e Law R eview 1631; and M ichael W alzer,
“D raw ing the Line: R eligion and Politics” (1999) U tah Law
R eview 619. For an interesting debate on the issue, see A udi &
W olterstorff, supra note 2.
A rguably, the w ide acceptance of these arguments may also in
some instances reflect lack of know ledge about religion, w hich
according to D avid Tracy, "is the single subject about w hich
many intellectuals can feel free to be ignorant. O ften abetted by
the churches, they need not study religion, for ‘everybody’
already know s what religion is: It is a private consumer product
that some people seem to need. Its former social role w as
poisonous. Its present privatization is harmless enough to w ish
it w ell from a civilized distance." Q uoted in Perry, Love and
Pow er, ibid. at 67.
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 73. W hen referring to the
“liberal position” w e are referring to w hat M ichael J. Sandel
describes as:

no one proposes that religious argument by
citizens in the public square should be illegal. 14
The thrust of the liberal position is that people of
faith should voluntarily abstain from basing their
public policy decisions on religious grounds or
from making religiously based arguments. This is
much the position of Robert Audi, who argues that
“[a]s advocates for laws and public policies . . .
and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous
citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any
rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for
the purpose.” 15 John Rawls argues for the
exclusion of religious or other comprehensive
philosophies in favour of what he calls “public
reason” in discussing and deciding “constitutional
issues” and “matters of basic justice.” 16 Richard
Rorty sounds a note of urgency, stating that
“[c]ontemporary liberal philosophers think that we
shall not be able to keep a democratic political
community going unless the religious believers
remain willing to trade privatization for a
guarantee of religious liberty.” 17

a version of liberalism prominent in the moral and
legal and political philosophy of the day. . . . Its
core thesis can be stated as follow s: society, being
composed of a plurality of persons, each w ith his
ow n aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is
best arranged w hen it is governed by principles that
do not them selves presuppose any particular
conception of the good; what justifies these
regulative principles above all is not that they
maximize the social w elfare or otherw ise promote
the good, but rather that they conform to the
concept of right, a moral category given prior to the
good and independent of it.

14

15

16
17

Liberalism and the Lim its of Justice, 2d ed. (C ambridge:
C am bridge U niversity Press, 1998) at 1 [emphasis in original].
A s Jonathan C haplin suggests, “liberal democracies rarely, if
ever, impose explicit constitutional or legal restraints on
employing [religious-based] arguments.” Therefore, Chaplin
focuses on the “moral and political legitimacy” accorded to
different kinds of arguments. Supra note 11 at 618.
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 17. W e w ould suggest that
the reference to coercive law s and policies does not limit A udi’s
position greatly, since in the final analysis, all law w ould seem
to contain a coercive element. O n A udi’s and Raw ls’
descriptions of the virtuous citizen, W olterstorff makes the
rather caustic response: “N o m atter w hat principles of justice a
particular political theorist m ay propose, the reasonable thing
for her to expect, given any plausible understanding w hatsoever
of ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all reasonable and
rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather that
not all of them w ould do so. It w ould be utterly unreasonable
for her to expect all of them to accept them.” A udi &
W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 99 [emphasis in original].
R aw ls, supra note 11 at 223-30.
R ichard Rorty, Philosophy and Social H ope (London: Penguin
B ooks, 1999) at 170-71 [R orty]. Paul H orw itz, supra note 9 at
27-28, sees Rorty’s comments revealing “a defensiveness about
the future of the liberal project itself and the future of the state
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The liberal positions on this issue differ in
various ways. 18 Some argue for constraints on all
religious argument in the public square;19 others,
like Rawls, would restrict religious argument only
when it is used to advocate or decide certain
fundamental matters. Still others would permit
religious argument, but only if the speaker is
willing and able to make the same point using
non-religious argument.20 Some argue for the
exclusion of religious arguments only; others for
all arguments grounded in comprehensive
philosophies. What unites these positions is a
common belief that religious reasons should not
be relied upon when political issues are being
decided in a liberal democracy.21
Proponents of exclusion argue that to allow
religious argument in the public square is divisive
or potentially divisive, and also in some way
unfair or disrespectful to those who do not share
the religious belief. These reasons are
unpersuasive. It also appears that the liberal
position is committed to an Enlightenment
epistemology that has been largely discredited in
the modern and postmodern world. In addition,
public reason as conceived by Rawls and others
does not generate sufficient principles to resolve
public policy debates. An appeal to fundamental
presuppositions usually grounded in some

18
19

20

21

. . . betray[ing] a view that beliefs and concepts that cannot be
understood in a rational manner represent threats both to reason
and to its offspring, liberal democracy.”
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 72 and follow ing.
Jonathan C haplin labels this position as “classical secular
liberalism,” and describes it as follow s: “[R]eligiously-based
arguments, w hile legally permitted, are incompatible with the
requirements of a liberal democratic political morality; virtuous
citizenship implies accepting the exclusion of religion from the
public square and relying only on arguments w hich,
supposedly, are equally accessible to all citizens – variously
termed ‘public,’ ‘secular,’ ‘common,’ ‘reasonable,’ or
‘rational.’ In a religiously pluralistic culture, such arguments by
definition cannot be religiously-based.” Chaplin, supra note 11
at 626.
C haplin (ibid. at 626-27) refers to this as the “inclusive” secular
view . Under this view , “religiously-based arguments may quite
freely be used to support proposals regarding law or public
policy” but “only on the condition that, in addition to w hatever
religiously-based arguments they [religious believers] may w ish
to advance, they must also advance (or stand ready to advance)
arguments w hich do not in any w ay depend on religious belief.
It is these non-religious arguments w hich turn out to carry the
necessary public legitimacy in governing debate and especially
decision; religiously-based arguments play, at best, a supporting
public role” [emphasis in original].
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 75.
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religious or
inevitable.

comprehensive

belief

seems

A RGUMENTS FOR E XCLUSION B ASED
O N A LLEGED D IVISIVENESS
One argument for excluding religious
argument is that it is divisive.22 The issue of
whether religion is a beneficial or corrosive force
in society is much debated, and it will not likely
ever be resolved. The debate turns as much on the
historical facts as it does on one’s views about
religion. A fair conclusion is that religion’s impact
has been at times divisive, at times beneficial, at
times neutral.
There are those who would argue that public
policy must be protected from religious influence
because religious beliefs are inherently irrational
or repressive and would lead inevitably to
irrational or repressive laws. Thus, Duncan B.
Forrester suggests that “[t]here is a widespread
and deep-seated conviction in the modern western
academy that religion is either a trivial or a malign
factor in political life.” 23 Certainly it is not
difficult to find numerous examples, whether
historical or present-day, where religion has been
used as an excuse for violence and oppression or
where religious institutions have supported, or at
least not actively resisted, violent and oppressive
regimes or policies. Others, though, would make
the opposite argument. Thus, Harold J. Berman
suggests that religion has influenced the law “in
the direction of greater humanity,” 24 and John von
Heyking argues that “[r]eligion helps liberal

22

23

24

See, for exam ple, W illiam P. M arshall, “The O ther Side of
R eligion” (1993) 44 H astings Law Journal 843.
Forrester, supra note 3 at 26. This conviction is sometimes used
as a basis for arguing that religious- based discourse should be
excluded from the public square. This contention requires a
response at tw o levels. First, it hardly seems acceptable to delegitimize a particular kind of public debate simply because it
might be used by those w hose politics w e disagree w ith.
Second, the underlying premise cannot be sustained. This
becomes very clear if w e move from theory to how people
actually debate social issues. W hen we do so the role of
religious belief on both sides of many contentious issues
becomes obvious. N o religion is internally homogenous and in
C anada religious pluralism is increased by the presence of a
number of different faith traditions.
B erm an, Law and Revolution, supra note 3 at 168.
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democracy at its weakest point by elevating it
from its characteristic vices.” 25
The plethora of examples on both sides of this
argument underscores the fact that even if we were
all agreed on a definition of the just society, there
could never be agreement as to whether the
influence of religion has consistently moved us
closer to, or farther from, attaining that goal.
Surely, this should hardly be surprising. Within
any religion there will be significant divergence as
to what God’s will is and how this should be
translated into societal relationships. Given the
spectrum of religious beliefs, there will be
individuals of faith making religious-based
arguments on both sides of almost any issue. Thus,
for example, while it is accurate to point to the
religious inspiration behind the American
abolitionist and civil rights movements,26 at the
same points in history there were church-goers
who viewed slavery or segregation as reflecting
God’s ordering of the universe.
Moreover, an important distinction can often
be drawn between a religious institution and
individual voices within it. Thus, in evaluating the
response of the church to, for instance, the
Holocaust, do we look at individuals such as
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, or at the stance of the
Catholic and Lutheran churches as institutions in
Nazi Germany? Do we look at the words and
actions of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, or of the
Christian Reformed Church in apartheid South
Africa? Do we consider the work of Latin
American Archbishop Oscar Romero, or the more
conservative Roman Catholicism prevalent in
Latin America? Nor can it be assumed that the
church as institution will always take a more
conservative stance than individuals within the
institution. The policy of the United Church of
Canada on gay and lesbian ordination and on
same-sex marriages is far less traditional than the
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John von H eyking, “The H armonization of H eaven and Earth?:
R eligion, Politics, and Law in Canada” (2000) 33 U niversity of
B ritish C olumbia Law Review 663 at 673. Similarly, Horw itz
(supra note 9 at 55) argues for a recognition of the “intrinsic
value of religion.” O ur position w ould probably be more akin
to K aren A rmstrong's, w ho points out that religion has often
been “cruel and coercive,” yet “[a]t its best (and only at its best)
religion had helped people to cultivate an appreciation of the
holiness of hum anity.” The Battle for G od (London: H arper
C ollins Publishers, 2000) at 199-201.
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 80.

views of at least some of those in the pews. No
religion is monolithic, and religion is far too
varied and complex to allow for any simplistic
generalizations about how faith and politics will
interact.
It is arbitrary and unprincipled to exclude
religious argument because of its divisiveness.
What beliefs are not potentially or actually
divisive? It has become something of a stock
argument to note the carnage of past religious
wars and to use that history as proof of religion’s
danger to a modern liberal democracy. In the
twentieth century, however, non-religious belief
systems, often hostile to religion, such as
Marxism, Communism, and Nazism led to the
deaths of hundreds of millions of people in
countless wars and acts of genocide. One of the
many lessons of the past century is that beliefs of
any kind have the potential to create discord.
Almost any public policy issue, regardless of
the terms on which it is discussed and debated, can
give rise to conflicts. Taxation, Aboriginal rights,
the decriminalization of drugs, Québec independence, gun registration, etc., have each caused
social friction and som etim es violence.
Furthermore, this dissension can occur even when
those on opposite sides do not make any explicit
references to comprehensive value systems.
Consider a hypothetical example: You and I may
both believe in helping the less fortunate in
society, and each of us may ground our belief in a
non-comprehensive philosophy. But there is ample
room for serious disagreement between us on how
to help the poor. Suppose that you support a
laissez-faire, market-driven, corporate agenda; I
favour interventionist economic strategies that
closely regulate and constrain corporate policies
and also tax the rich heavily. My position flows
from a belief, supported by historical and
sociological studies, about the relationship
between poverty and business corporations in
North America. Yours is grounded in a devotion
to a particular reading of Adam Smith and his
modern disciples, such as Milton Friedman.
Neither of us makes any arguments grounded in
religious belief; indeed, we do not intend an
appeal to any comprehensive philosophies
whatsoever. Each supports our position with
arguments we consider empirical, reasoned, and
scientific. Nevertheless, this sort of disagreement
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and argument has been exceptionally divisive in
the rich, Western world and has often led to
violence in the past few decades. One only has to
recall the violence at the Québec Summit of the
Americas in April 2001 to realize that positions of
any kind, strongly held, can lead to division and
sometimes civil unrest. 27
Even if someone takes a position explicitly
based on religious beliefs, this does not
necessarily make it more divisive than arguments
based on other comprehensive philosophies. If an
individual makes an argument about a particular
law or public policy, and links that argument to
his or her religious beliefs, some listeners will
agree with the public policy stance but not with
the religious reasoning; others will disagree with
the speaker’s position on that particular issue but
see the references to religion as valid; a third
group will agree with both aspects; and a fourth
group will reject everything the speaker says.
Does this make the reference to religion
exclusionary or divisive? It is difficult to think of
secular arguments, buttressed with reference to a
particular secular ideology, that would not meet
the same four-fold response. As Jonathan Chaplin
has pointed out, perspectives grounded in secular
philosophies do not enjoy anything close to
universal support and are frequently at odds with
each other on significant public policy issues. 28
If certain sorts of arguments are going to be
excluded because they are divisive, it appears that
the public square will be bereft of almost any
argument and debate, save for the most banal
exchange of narrow platitudes. The liberal
position assumes an ideal society of citizens who
share common political principles of sufficient
richness and complexity to address the thorny
public policy issues of the day. Unfortunately,
someone relying solely on public reasons cannot
resolve even the most basic policy debate. Assume
agreement on Rawls’ two fundamental liberal
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V iolent chaos broke out in Q uéb ec C ity w hen protesters
representing environmental, labour, and human rights
organizations clashed with police w hile protesting the free trade
talks being held by representatives of numerous countries of the
A mericas. The protesters opposed the Free Trade A rea of the
A mericas because of a belief that it would hurt the poor. See for
instance, “Summit of the A mericas,” online: The Globe and
M ail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/serials/summit 2001/>.
C haplin, supra note 11 at 640.
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principles of legitimacy.29 For example, suppose
agreement on the principle of legitimacy that the
government should treat all persons as free and
equal. How does that principle resolve an issue
such as the distribution of resources within
society, given the various ways that wealth can be
distributed? Kent Greenawalt discusses the various
approaches that could be used:
Among the most familiar are the Marxist
formula, “From each according to his
abilities, to each according to his needs,”
the utilitarian principle of maximizing
average or total welfare, and the
suggestion of Rawls that distribution
should be equal except as inequality will
increase goods for representative
members of the least advantaged
economic group. In different respects
each of these views treats all citizens as
equal. For Marx, each’s needs count
equally; for the utilitarian, each’s capacity
for happiness (or some surrogate) counts
equally in the search for maximum overall
welfare; for Rawls, each’s entitlement to
resources in a fundamental sense is equal
and inequalities are allowed only if
everyone is made better off.
A choice among these and other distributive approaches will depend on some
initial premise about proper notions of
human equality and upon complex
judgments about human nature and actual
or potential social relations.30
Rawls’ principles of legitimacy must be
informed at every turn by other more fundamental
assumptions about reality. This is another reason
why religious and other comprehensive
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R aw ls’ tw o principles of justice are: Each person has an equal
claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties, w hich scheme is compatible w ith the same scheme for
all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. Social and
economic inequalities are to satisfy tw o conditions: first, they
are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they are
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society. Supra note 11 at 5-6.
G reenaw alt, Religious C on victions, supra no te 11 at 174
[footnotes omitted]; see also, Audi & W olterstorff, supra note
2 at 103.
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philosophies should not be, indeed cannot be,
excluded from public discourse. They are often
relevant (and sometimes necessary) for the
resolution of many issues of concern in a liberal
democracy.
Unless we believe that all arguments about
what is right or wrong in a particular situation are
either completely arbitrary or completely
motivated by self-interest, then we have to accept
that when people talk about various policy options
as good or bad, they are measuring the options
against a larger sense of right and wrong – in other
words, against some sort of theory of justice,
however incompletely expressed. Even those who
reject all religious beliefs would be hard pressed to
articulate a vision of justice without reference to
some underlying set of beliefs – whether
humanism, feminism, Marxism, liberalism,
conservatism, or libertarianism – that are also
based on ultimately unverifiable assumptions, in
the same way as religious beliefs.
The liberal position inevitably must espouse
the truth of certain propositions, such as the
equality of all people or the fundamental value of
human freedom. A religious person might espouse
the importance of worshipping God. To argue for
the truth of these propositions both parties must
assert non-empirical presuppositions, beliefs about
the nature of reality. Even those who claim to
disavow underlying foundational beliefs still seem
to have fairly clear ideas about what kind of
society we should be trying to create – a concept
of the good that seems to be based on faith
assumptions about how we should and should not
treat our fellow human beings. As Moon argues,
“At root, public debate and decision-making is
about issues of fundamental value. Moreover, as
many others have pointed out, so-called secular
values have a religious pedigree, and a
transcendent or faith-based character.” 31

A RGUMENTS FOR E XCLUSION B ASED
ON A LLEGED U NFAIRNESS
Religious arguments are sometimes said to be
unfair because they are inaccessible to those who
31
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Supra note 8 at 573.

do not hold the religious belief.32 Thus, Richard
Rorty claims that “[t]he main reason religion
needs to be privatized is that, in political
discussion with those outside the relevant religious
community, it is a conversation-stopper.” 33 But is
this really the case? Suppose someone argues in
favour of protecting the environment because,
according to the Book of Genesis, humanity is
responsible for safeguarding God’s creation, the
earth. This is an argument from authority. Leaving
aside the fact that these sorts of arguments are
unlikely to be persuasive to someone who does not
accept the authority of the Bible, or this particular
interpretation of it, why is it unfair to someone
who does not share the same religious belief or
any religious belief at all? Is it inaccessible to that
person, and if so in what sense?
It does not seem to be inaccessible, even to
someone who does not accept the Bible as
authority. The appeal to the authority of Scripture
is no different than an appeal to any authority,
religious or otherwise. It is an assertion that the
source of the knowledge is, in and of itself,
grounds for accepting the argument, or at least
grounds for giving it serious consideration.
Arguments from authority are well-known
rhetorical strategies, common in discussion and
debate.
Is the appeal to religious belief inaccessible in
the sense that it is incomprehensible? For someone
who has not read the first few chapters of Genesis,
the meaning of the argument may be unknown but
is surely not unknowable or incomprehensible.
The Bible is available for reading and study to
anyone, as are the Koran and other religious texts.
The person making the argument could be asked
to explain its meaning in non-religious language.
Non-believers can be as knowledgeable about
religious arguments as believers, and often are.
Someone who is unfamiliar with arguments
grounded in supply-side economic theory, put
forward by an economist who believes in that
particular theory, is in the same position as
someone who is met with the argument that
humanity is the God-appointed steward of the
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See e.g., K ent G reenaw alt, “G rounds for Political Judgment,”
supra note 11; and A bner S. G reene, “Is Religion Special?”
(1994) U niversity of Illinois Law R eview 535.
R orty, supra note 17 at 171.
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earth. Each will, if they so choose, need to gain a
better understanding of the argument by
familiarizing themselves with the appropriate texts
or by asking questions.
Are religious arguments incomprehensible in
the sense that a non-believer cannot understand
the basis for the belief – e.g., faith in God or faith
in a religious text? W hile it may be true that there
is a sort of psychological separation or divide
between a believer and a non-believer (the
believer has faith in the particular thing or person,
the non-believer does not), anyone can understand
the nature of faith in some sense because everyone
(or seemingly everyone) has at least at one time or
another had faith in someone or something. The
non-believer can therefore com e to an
understanding of a believer’s faith by analogy.34
If, therefore, the substance of the belief is not
inaccessible (e.g., humanity as stewards of God’s
world) and the faith basis of the belief is
accessible by analogy, it is hard to countenance
the argument that religious argument is
inaccessible to the non-believer. 35
Even if religious arguments are in some way
inaccessible, it does not follow that they should
therefore be excluded from the public square.
There is always the possibility that the person who
finds the religious argument inaccessible will find
a means of access or understanding, or if not, will
simply give the argument no weight, thereby
eliciting and requiring alternative arguments. Such
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The classic definition of faith in the C hristian N ew Testament
is found at H ebrews 11:1, w here faith is described as “the
confidant assurance that w hat w e hope for is going to happen.”
M ark R. N orton, ed., H oly Bible, New Living Translation
(W heaton, IL: Tyndale H ouse, 1996).
In fact, w e w ould suggest that, even for those who do not
themselves subscribe to religious beliefs, a recognition of the
religious aspects of many social issues w ould seem to be
necessary for those involved with politics or the law. By way of
example, consider a case where parents have made a decision
to refuse conventional medical treatment for their ill child, and
that decision is being challenged by the state. Suppose the
parents reject the premises underlying conventional W estern
medicine and are wholehearted disciples of some alternative
approach to treatment. W hile it is certainly not necessary for the
lawyers and the judge involved in the case (or for those crafting
a legislative response to such a case) to embrace the same
philosophy of treatment, it seems obvious that they will be
better able to represent the parents, respond to the parents’
arguments, decide the case, or draft effective legislation if they
have some understanding of (even if not agreement w ith) the
premises on w hich the parents based their decision.
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is the nature of debate and discourse, even debates
where religious arguments are excluded.

A RGUMENTS FOR E XCLUSION B ASED
ON A LLEGED D ISRESPECT
Is it disrespectful to support a political
decision for reasons that not all citizens accept as
appropriate? A Buddhist, for example, might
support a particular environmental policy because
her religious teachings tell her that all life is
sacred. Is the Buddhist being disrespectful to those
who do not share and perhaps cannot comprehend
the basis for her political decision? A central claim
of the liberal position is that citizens should not,
out of respect for every citizen's freedom and
equality, rely on reasons for their decisions they
could not expect these fellow citizens to endorse.
If the environmental policy is given the force of
law by the state, then some citizens are subject to
the coercive power of the state for reasons they
find unacceptable.36 Is this disrespectful?
One response to this argument is to ask what
the ethic of respect requires. 37 It is certainly not
self-evident that a citizen in such a situation has
been treated disrespectfully. Nor is it self-evident
that a liberal democracy requires that citizens
respect other citizens in this way. The liberal
position assumes a definition of respect that is
contested. By contrast, why should we not begin
with the assumption that it is disrespectful to ask
the Buddhist to justify her decision on grounds
acceptable to all citizens? Why privilege the idea
of public reasons? Wolterstorff wonders whether
appropriate respect is being paid in the following
situation:
Suppose that you offer to me reasons
derived from your comprehensive
standpoint; and that I, fully persuaded of
the moral impropriety of such behaviour
by the advocates of the liberal position,
brush your remarks aside with the
comment that in offering me such
reasons, you are not paying due respect
to my status as free and equal. Only if you
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R aw ls, supra note 11 at 217-18.
A udi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 109.
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offer me reasons derived from the
independent source [public reasons] will
you be paying me due respect. To offer
me such reasons is to demean me; I will
not listen.38
Is the adherent of the liberal position being
respectful here? The ethic of respect may require
that I listen to others in their particularity, and
permit them to make political decisions that are
supported by their particular beliefs, rather than
requiring them to appeal to public reason.39
A second response is to question the assertion
that political decisions are not legitimate when
based on religious or other comprehensive beliefs.
Many, perhaps most, citizens in a liberal
democracy hold that political legitimacy is
satisfied when, after a full and fair debate that was
open to all citizens, a majority of citizens vote in
favour of a policy or in favour of a government
that develops a particular policy.40 This procedure
forms the bedrock of liberal democracies and to
most citizens is considered reasonable and fair.41
It is a way of making political decisions that
accommodates and reflects the plural and
multifaceted nature of the citizenry in W estern
democracies. It accords also with the very nature
of discussion and debate, which inevitably
involves a clash of opposing and divergent points
of view. Differences in political discussions, like
debate of any kind, usually turn not on a
disagreement over facts or the logic of an
argument, but on fundamental disagreement about
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Ibid. at 110.
Ibid. at 111.
W olterstorff suggests that only three sorts of constraints are
needed for citizens engaged in public policy debates. All
arguments in the public square should be made w ith civility and
respect; all arguments must be conducted in accordance w ith
the rule of law; and arguments should be made to further the
goal of social and political justice, not out of self-interest or
personal gain. Ibid. at 112, 113.
The one fairly recent addition to this conception of democracy
is the recognition that decision making by majority vote may be
unfair to groups in society who, because of historic and
continuing marginalization, run the risk of rarely having their
view s, particularly on those issues most related to their
marginalization, reflected by the majority. This recognition has
led to the development of certain protections through human
rights legislation and the C harter. This does not, how ever,
negate the underlying premise that on any particular issue, some
w ithin the state will not agree w ith the position taken by the
majority and yet if that position has been crystallized into law ,
they are just as subject to the coercive pow er of the state as
anyone else.

basic assumptions. Once the disputants have
determined that neither has committed an error of
logic and each has a clear apprehension of the
facts, the debate must inevitably turn to basic
assumptions if one side is to prevail in persuasion
over the other. No one in this day and age should
ever expect to find widespread agreement over
basic assumptions. Pleas to limit arguments to
those with which any reasonable person could
agree assume the possibility of finding universally
held positions and fail to recognize that the very
concept of reasonableness is contested.

A RGUMENTS FOR E XCLUSION
R ELATED TO C ONSTITUTIONAL
C ONCERNS
Another argument against the use of religious
arguments to justify political decisions takes a
constitutional form. It is two-pronged. It is said
that the use of religious reasons to support public
policy is contrary to freedom from religion, and,
further, that religious arguments that become law
represent the “establishment” of religion within
the state.42
Moon summarizes the relevant constitutional
protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees to all persons
“freedom of conscience and religion.”
The Charter, however, does not include
a n y o b v io u s e q u i v a le n t to th e
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Bill of
Rights. According to the Canadian courts,
s. 2(a), the freedom of religion provision
in the Charter, protects the individual
from “coercion in matters of conscience.”
It prohibits the state from either restricting
or compelling religious practice. But it
does not necessarily preclude state
support for religion. State support for the
practices or institutions of a particular
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For a discussion of the s. 2(a) jurisprudence, see H orw itz, supra
note 9. He argues (at 6) that “the proper approach of the courts
and the state to religion should be both supportive and
accommodating.”
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religion will breach s. 2(a) only if it
coerces some members of the community,
and interferes with their ability to practice
their faith or compels them to practice the
favoured religion.43
The Charter may render unconstitutional laws
that adopt religious symbols as symbols of the
state, mandate prayer in schools, interfere with the
practice of religion, or prohibit certain activities
for a primarily religious reason. 44 Certainly, as
Moon concludes, “[t]he State should remain
neutral on the issue of what is the true faith. It
should not prefer one religion over another.” 45
This is very different, however, from the question
of whether commitment to liberal democracy
requires one to eschew religious-based arguments
on matters of public policy.
Is it contrary to the Charter guarantee of
“freedom of conscience and religion” for a citizen
to base decisions concerning public policy on
religious grounds? Clearly, the answer on this
question is no. There is no legal or constitutional
constraint on the reasons she uses to justify her
decisions. There are, of course, constraints on how
one may express that religious reasoning. In Ross
v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,46 the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the freedom of
an individual to express her religious beliefs is not
unlimited “and is restricted by the right of others
to hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions of
their own, and to be free from injury from the
exercise of the freedom of religion of others.” 47
The Court concluded that “[i]n relation to freedom
of religion, any religious belief that denigrates and
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See, for example, R. v. Big M D rug M art, [1985] 1 S.C .R . 295,
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Freedom of R eligion, Secularism, and the Liberal State” (2002)
17 C anadian Journal of Law & Society 39 at 56. For another
critical reading of Big M , see H orw itz, supra note 9.
M oon, supra note 8 at 573.
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Ross, ibid. at para. 72.
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defames the religious beliefs of others erodes the
very basis of the guarantee in s. 2(a) – a basis that
guarantees that every individual is free to hold and
to manifest the beliefs dictated by one’s
conscience.” 48 Thus, while we argue that public
reliance upon religious reasoning should be
recognized as legitimate, we also acknowledge
(and in fact support) the constitutional constraint
that beliefs or values – whether religious or
otherwise – are not to be expressed in ways that
diminish others’ freedom of belief or that
denigrate the essential humanity of others.

A RGUMENTS FOR E XCLUSION B ASED
ON E PISTEMOLOGICAL G ROUNDS
It appears that the real weight of
constitutional, philosophical, and other arguments
for excluding religious-based arguments rests on
epistemological grounds – on the assumption that
a coherent and relevant distinction can be made
between the secular world and the religious world.
Thus, the liberal position assumes that it is
possible for a citizen to be “free from religion,”
for religion and faith to operate in the private
realm, and for reason or “non-religious values” to
hold sway in the secular, public world. On this
view of the world, any incursion into the public
square of religious reasons or law based on
relig io u s v alu es is im p e rm issib le an d
inappropriate.
W hile it is certainly possible to be free not to
practice religion and to create a public space free
of religious symbols and practices (and the
Charter protects those rights), it is not possible for
the secular realm to be free of metaphysical
beliefs, some of which are religious. As Benson
explains:
The term “secular” has come to mean a
realm that is neutral or, more precisely,
“religion-free.” Implicit in this religionfree neutrality is the notion that the
secular is a realm of facts distinct from
the realm of faith. This understanding,
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Ibid. at para. 94. For a discussion of this issue, see D avid M .
B row n, “Freedom From or Freedom For: Religion as a C ase
Study in D efining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33
U niversity of B ritish C olumbia Law R eview 551 at 599.
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however, is in error. . . . States cannot be
neutral towards metaphysical claims.
Their very inaction towards certain claims
operates as an affirmation of others. This
realization of the faith-based nature of all
decisions will be important as the courts
seek to give meaning to terms such as
secular in statutes written some time
ago.49
On this issue, it is relevant to consider a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.50
Chamberlain involved judicial review of a
decision of a school board to prohibit three books
on same-sex parenting from being used in the
classroom. This prohibition was clearly based on
the religious beliefs of the school board members.
The relevant legislation 51 required school boards
to act in a “secular” and “non-sectarian” fashion.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
found the school board's decision unreasonable
and remanded the issue of whether the books
should be approved to the board. The Court noted
that in light of the legislation, “the school board
must consider the interests of all its constituents
and not permit itself to act as the proxy of a
particular religious view held by some members of
the community, even if that group holds the
majority of seats on the board.” 52 However, the
Court was very clear that:
[t]he Act's insistence on strict secularism
does not mean that religious concerns
have no place in the deliberations and
decisions of the Board. Board members
are entitled, and indeed required, to bring
the views of the parents and communities
they represent to the deliberation process.
Because religion plays an important role
in the life of many communities, these
views will often be motivated by religious
concerns. Religion is an integral aspect of
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Iain T. B enson, “N otes Tow ards a (R e)definition of the
‘Secular’” (2000) 33 U niversity of B ritish Colum bia Law
R eview 519 at 520. On this issue of the definition of the term
secular and its relationship to religious belief, see also Chaplin,
supra note 11; von H eyking, supra note 25; and Berger, supra
note 44.
C ham berlain, supra note 7.
School Act, R .S.B .C . 1996 c. 412, as amended, s. 76.
C ham berlain, supra note 7 at para. 27.

people's lives, and cannot be left at the
boardroom door. What secularism does
rule out, however, is any attempt to use
the religious views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration
the values of other members of the
community. A requirement of secularism
implies that, although the Board is indeed
free to address the religious concerns of
parents, it must be sure to do so in a
manner that gives equal recognition and
respect to other members of the
community.53
This statement suggests that the Supreme Court of
Canada is developing a nuanced understanding of
the concept of “secular,” which legitimates, but
does not privilege, arguments based on religious
belief.
In another recent case, Trinity Western
University v. British Columbia College of
Teachers,54 the Supreme Court of Canada
recognized that religious values are interwoven in
the fabric of Canadian society, and it implicitly
rejected a simplistic separation or division of the
secular and the religious. Trinity Western involved
judicial review of a decision of the B.C. College
of Teachers. The College had refused Trinity
Western University certification for its teacher
education program because students were required
to sign a ”community standards” document
agreeing to refrain from various “un-Biblical”
behaviours, including homosexuality. In the
course of its discussion, the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada commented: “The
diversity of Canadian society is partly reflected in
the multiple religious organizations that mark the
societal landscape and this diversity of views
should be respected.” 55
It is useful to situate this discussion in the
broader historical and philosophical context. The
period of the Enlightenment exposed and
exacerbated a developing rift between science and
r e lig io n . “T h e fu n d am e n ta l a x io m o f
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Ibid. at para. 19. For a discussion of the approach taken by the
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Enlightenment thought was that the world could
be understood through the objective application of
reason and science once the distorting influence of
religious ideologies was overcome.” 56 Over the
years, the secular became the domain of reason
and objective truth, publicly verifiable; religion
was relegated to the margins of individual belief,
either unprovable or untrue.
A critical assumption of the liberal position on
the issue of religious discourse in the public
square is that a form of human reason exists that
enjoys a different epistemological basis – a
superior grounding in truth – than religious belief,
which therefore justifies the exclusion of religious
argument from the public square. Rawls’ position
is typical of the liberal position because he appears
to rely on a conception of human reason in the
Lockean Enlightenment sense, a reason that
somehow transcends human experience and that,
functioning properly, will lead to agreement and
consensus on fundamental matters.57 The liberal
epistemology is at odds with the postmodern
perspective, which, as described by Richard
Tarnas, reflects an “appreciation of the
multidimensional nature of reality, the manysidedness of the human spirit and the multivalent,
symbolically mediated nature of hum an
knowledge and experience.” 58
In Chamberlain, the Supreme Court of Canada
appeared to recognize that almost all arguments
that are made for or against a particular public
policy are likely to be rooted in a larger complex
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of values and beliefs. Elaine Pagels notes, for
example, that divergent conceptions about the
proper role of the state can often be traced to
different assumptions about human nature.59 These
assumptions may inform our religious discourse
(God made humanity good according to the
creation myth in the Book of Genesis; or
conversely, humanity is flawed, according to a
different interpretation of the same text). Or these
fundamental assumptions may inform other forms
of discourse, such as political philosophy
(followers of Rousseau see natural human
goodness corrupted by society; other traditions
following philosophers such as Hobbes advocate
societal structure to constrain human impulses,
which they believe tend to disorder and chaos
when unfettered).60
A fundamental assumption about human
nature (or whether there is such a thing as human
nature) is beyond conclusive empirical proof. We
may hold these sorts of beliefs or assumptions for
a variety of reasons: our psychological makeup;
what our parents taught us; what we learned in
church, synagogue, mosque, or temple; our
unique life experience; etc. Nevertheless, these
assumptions affect how each of us understands
and explains the world; these beliefs inform what
we call human reason. These beliefs and
assumptions are interwoven both into the fabric of
the individual citizen and the fabric of Canadian
society. The Supreme Court of Canada noted in
Trinity Western that the diversity of Canadian
society is “partly reflected” in its religious
organizations. We would add also in its citizens
who hold religious beliefs. It has always has been
impossible to separate religious belief and secular
reason, because “our common human reason is
always a programmed human reason; what we
come to believe by the use of our reason
(whatever Rawls might have in mind by that) is a
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function, in part, of what we already believe. And
we differ in our belief – differ in particular, now,
in our comprehensive perspectives.” 61

C ONCLUSION
The modern W estern liberal democracy
thrives on a diversity of ideas and vigorous debate.
We agree with Veit Bader that rather than
prohibiting certain sources of public discourse “we
should try to tell the ‘whole truth’ as we see it on
whatever topic and whenever it makes sense,
accept that others do the same on an equal footing,
tell it in understandable language, and discuss it in
a civilized way.” 62
The “whole truth” for many citizens cannot be
told without an appeal to their religious beliefs.
This is hardly surprising, given that the
fundamental values of the Western legal tradition
are firmly rooted in religious doctrines of past
centuries. And, of course, the fact that many, if not
most, citizens in Canada and the W est are still
committed in various ways to a religion makes it
inevitable that these beliefs would inform their
social and political discussions. Issues such as
same-sex marriage and the right to die have, for
many people, important religious dimensions.
Anyone who wants to fully participate in a
discussion of these issues must therefore
understand this religious dimension. Rather than
try to exclude religious argument from the public
square, we should welcome a rich diversity of
ideas from a multitude of different perspectives.
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